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Summary  findings
Realizing that trade liberalization would require periodic  domestic interests that would bear the costs of restricted
adjustments because of problems in particular industries,  access to imports.
GATT's framers provided that tariff reductions that led  Finger offers guidelines for a safeguards process that
to such problems could be renegotiated;  in an emergency  makes more economic and political sense:
a country could raise its tariff first and negotiate  * Identify the costs and losers as well as the benefits
compensation with the principal exporting countries  and winners.
later.  * Be clear that ilhe  action is an exception to the
GATT lists many provisions that allow import  principles underlying the liberalization program.
restrictions, provisions that, over time, have proven quite  Emphasize that too many such exceptions would
fungible. Renegotiations were replaced by negotiated  constitute abandonment of the liberalization program
quantitative restraints (VERs),  which were replaced by  and its benefits. Included in the investigation process
antidumping. The problem (troublesome imports) was  should be an expression of the costs the proposed
always the same, but the instruments changed.  restriction would impose.
And none of the instruments made much political or  *  Don't sanctify the criteria  for the action. Procedures
economic sense.  should not presume, as antidumping does, that there is
They did not help a government isolate those import  some good reason for granting exceptions. Providing a
restrictions for which the benefits to the domestic  list of good reasons invites protection-seekers to
economy would exceed the costs.  demonstrate that they qualify and places the government
And politically, the procedures through which  in the position of having to demonstrate that they do
renegotiations, VERs, or antidumping actions are  not. Procedures should stress that the function of the
decided provide a public tribune for interests that would  review is to identify the benefits, costs, and domestic
benefit from protection but provide no voice for  winners and losers from the action requested.
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GATT EXPERIENCE WITH SAFEGUARDS:
Making Economic and Political Sense of the Possibilities  That the GATT Allows to Restrict
Imports
J. Michael Finger
GATT's framers realized that trade liberalization  would require periodic adjustments to take into
account particular problems that would arise in particular industries. The original GATT
provided that tariff reductions that led to such problems could be renegotiated.  In an emergency,
a country could raise its tariff first, then negotiate compensation with the principal exporting
countries.
GATT also includes a long list of other provisions that allow import restrictions, and over
time, these provisions have proven to be quite fungible. Whatever the reason behind a
government's "need" to raise a tariff rate, the action could be given legal cover under any number
of provisions.
Over time, countries whose tariffs have been effectively  bound under the GATT have used
different instruments to deal with troublesome imports: renegotiations were eventually replaced
by negotiated quantitative restraints (VERs), VERs in turn gave way to antidumping. The
problem was always the same -- troublesome imports -- but the politically  and legally most
convenient instrument to deal with these troublesome imports changed.
From the perspective of both economic and political sense, none of these instruments have
much to recommend them.  In economics, none of them helps a government to isolate those
import restrictions for which the benefits to the domestic economy would exceed the costs.  In
politics, the procedures through which renegotiations or VERs or antidumping actions are
decided provide a public tribune for interests that would benefit from protection, but provide no
voice for the domestic interests who would bear the costs of restricted access to imports.
Antidumping is particularly unsuitable because it provides protection-seekers the rhetorical
opportunity to complain about foreign unfairness, yet it gives the government no basis for
answering that rhetoric in cases in which the national economic interest would not be served by
the restriction.
The key determinant of when an import restriction will be imposed should be its impact on
the domestic economy. Who in the domestic economy would benefit from the proposed import
restriction, and who would lose?  On each side, by how much? It is important to emphasize that
import using interests should be taken into account.  GATT/WTO safeguard procedures require
only that a trade restricting action be preceded by an injury determination, a determination that
domestic import competing producers would benefit. They do not however disallow the
consideration of the impact on users.
The following guidelines are offered for a safeguards process that would make economic
and political sense.
Identify the costs and the losers as well as the benefits and the winners. The sense of this
is explained just above.Be clear that the action is an exception.  Public statements should establish that the
requested action would be an exception to the principles that underlay the liberalization program
and should emphasize that an accumulation of such exceptions would constitute abandonment of
the liberalization program and loss of its benefits. Including in the investigation process an
expression of the costs that the proposed restriction would impose will help to make the point that
the action is an exception to the generally  beneficial policy of openness to international
competition.
Don 't sanctify the criteria for the action.  Procedures should not presume, as antidumping
does, that there is some good reason for granting exceptions. Providing a list of good reasons
invites protection-seekers to demonstrate that that they qualify, and places the government in the
position of having to demonstrate that they do not. Procedures should stress that the function of
the review is to identify the benefits, costs, and the domestic winners and losers for the requested
action.
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ANNEX TABLE.25GATT EXPERIENCE WITH SAFEGUARDS:
Making Economic and Political Sense of the Possibilities That the GATT
Allows to Restrict Imports
J. Michael Finger
Lead Economist, International Trade Division
World Bank
Trade liberalization is not rocket science. Any program that significantly  opens the
domestic market to international competition will require a degree of fine tuning.  Likewise, any
government that maintains a liberal trade policy will be subject to occasional pressures for
exception treatment, e.g., temporary protection for a particular industry.  Thus, part of the politics
of safeguarding a generally liberal trade policy is to have in place a policy mechanism for
managing such pressures; i.e., for considering petitions for protection that is exceptional to the
general thrust of policy.
This paper is about such policies. The analytical  part reviews the use of GATT/WTO
rules that specify how and when a member country may introduce a new trade restriction or
replace an old one.  (I do not distinguish one instance from the other.)
I draw two major lessons from this analysis:
1.  GATT/WTO rules are fungible. At different times, members have used different instruments
to handle safeguard issues.'
2.  GATT/WTO rules do not distinguish economically  sensible  trade restrictions - those that add
more to the national economic interest than they take away - from ordinary protection.
The prescriptive part of the paper draws lessons from the GATTIWTO experience, lessons
that a government might take into account when it is deliberating the structure of a safeguard
A corollary  is that GATT/WTO  rules that there is considerable  overlap  between  GATT/WTO  rules that provide  a
pressure  valve  against  domestic  pressures  for  protection  and  those  that  police  the "fairness"  of  trade  practices.mechanism that would help it to manage pressures from particular industries for "exceptional"
import protection as the government implements a liberalization  program or works to maintain a
policy of openness to international competition.
An important dimension of the policy is that there is more to designing a sensible
safeguard mechanism  than simply  to find what trade restrictions the GATT/WTO allows.  In this
regard, GATT/WTO rules are too generous - imposing all the restrictions that are allowed
would isolate an economy from the global system.  The challenge a government faces is to
identify, among the many processes the GATT/WTO allows, a safeguard system that makes
economic and political sense - one that separates between restrictions that will and will not
advance the national economic interest and one whose political dimensions  will help to support
the government's concern to integrate its economy into the global system.
Until the end of the Uruguay Round, GATT specifications of allowed trade restrictions
were of limited relevance to developing countries. Many developing countries had bound only a
few of their tariff positions under the GATT; hence they could increase these tariffs without
violating their GATT obligations. Another was that the detailed specifications for many trade
restrictions the GATT allowed were provided in the Tokyo Round Codes, and many developing
countries who were GATT members chose not to subscribe to the Codes.
The Uruguay Round agreements changed things. All parts of'the agreements apply to all
members (a country does not have the option to sign one agreement but not another) and
developing countries have all submitted schedules of bound tariff rates.2 The GATT/WTO
guidelines and specifications  thus apply to developing countries, and the experience with these
guidelines and specifications  by other countries is now relevant to the policy choices that
developing countries will make.
2 A number  of developing  countries  have maintained  some  leeway  by binding  at rates  that are above  presently
applied rates.
21.  GATT EXPERIENCE WITH SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS
While the GATT is perhaps best known as the patron of agreements to remove trade
restrictions, it includes a number of provisions that allow countries to impose new ones.  Twenty
of them are listed in Table 1, and the list could be longer. Article XX, (General Exceptions) for
example, includes 10 sub-categories of allowed restrictions. 3
PRESSURE VALVES IN GATT 1947
The industrial countries have opened their economies to international competition
primarily through reciprocal negotiations under the GATT.  These reductions, particularly at the
beginning, were taken tentatively - the signatories left themselves room to adjust the reductions
each had agreed.  The agreement gave each country an automatic right to renegotiate any of its
reductions after three years (Article XXVIII), and under "sympathetic consideration" procedures,
reductions could be renegotiated more quickly. Even quicker adjustment was possible under
Article XIX.  In instances of particularly troublesome increases of imports, a country could
introduce a new restriction then afterwards renegotiate a compensating agreement with its trading
partners.4 The idea of compensation was the same here as with a renegotiation, to provide on
some other product a reduction that suppliers considered equally valuable.
GATT's initial signatories recognized the need to provide for adjustment.
In the 1950's the GATT was amended to add more elaborate renegotiation provisions.
Though the details were complex, the renegotiation process, in outline, was straightforward.
1.  A country for which import of some product had become particularly troublesome would
advise the GATT and the principal exporters of that product that it wanted to renegotiate its
previous tariff reduction.
3For  example,  restrictions  necessary  to protect  human,  animal or plant life or health, restrictions  related  to the
conservation  of exhaustible  natural  resources.
The early GATT  rounds  were collections  of bilateral  negotiations,  but tariff cuts had to be made  on a most
favored  nations  basis (i.e.,  applicable  to imports  from all GATT  members). A renegotiation  was not with the
entire GATT  membership,  but only  with  the country  with  whom  that reduction  was initially  negotiated,  plus
any other  countries  enumerated  by the GATT  as "principal  suppliers."
32.  If, after a certain number of days, negotiation had not reached agreement, the country could
go ahead and increase the tariff.
3.  If the initiating country did so -and  at the same time did not provide compensation that
exporters considered satisfactory  -then  the principal exporters were free to retaliate.
4.  All of these actions were subject to the most favored nations principle; the tariff reductions or
increases had to apply to imports from all countries. 5
Article XIX, titled "Emergency Actions on Imports of Particular Products," but often
referred to as the escape clause or the safeguard clause, provided a country with an import
problem quicker access to essentially  the same process.  Under Article XIX:
1.  If imports cause or threaten serious injury 6 to domestic producers, the country could take
emergency action to restrict those imports.
2.  If subsequent consultation with exporters did not lead to satisfactory compensation, then the
exporters could retaliate.
The GATT asked the country taking emergency action to consult with exporting countries
before, but allowed the action to come first in "critical circumstances." In practice, the action has
come first most of the time.7
History shows that during GATT's first decade and a half, countries opening their
economies to international competition through the GATT negotiations did avail themselves of
pre,vure  valve  actions (Chart 1). These actions were in large part renegotiations under Article
XXVIII, supplemented by emergency actions (restrict first, then negotiate compensation) under
the procedures of Article XIX. 8 By 1963, fifteen years after the GATT first came into effect,
every one of the 29 GATT member countries who had bound tariff reductions under the GATT
Renegotiation  procedures  are basically  the same  now -- under the Uruguay  Round  Agreements  -- as they were
then.
6 The Uruguay  Round agreement  on safeguards  (but not the initial GATT)  requires  a formal investigation  and
determination  of injury. It allows  however  a provisional  safeguard  measure  to be taken  before  the
investigation  is completed.
7 GATT 1994,  p. 486. The Uruguay  Round Safeguards  Agreement  modified  the emergency  action procedure  in
several  ways. Among  these,
*  no compensation  is required  nor retaliation  allowed  in the first three  years a :restriction  is in place.
*  no restriction  (including  extension)  may be for more  than eight years,  (ten years by a developing  country).
*  all measures  of more  than 1  year must be progressively  liberalized.
Though,  as Chart 1 shows,  the mix shifted  over  time  toward  a larger  proportion  of emergency  actions.
4had undertaken at least one renegotiation - in total, 1  10 renegotiations, or almost four per
country.
In use, Article XIX emergency actions and Article XXVIII renegotiations complemented
each together.  Nine of the 15 pre- 1962 Article XIX actions that were large enough that the
exporter insisted on compensation (or threatened retaliation) were eventually resolved as Article
XXVIII renegotiations.  Article XXVIII renegotiations, in turn, were often folded into regular
tariff negotiations.  From 147 through 1961, five negotiating rounds were completed; hence such
negotiations were almost continuously under way.
In GATT's early years, renegotiations and emergency actions followed by renegotiations were the
principle mechanisms for making adjustments.
OTHER  GATT PROVISIONS THAT SERVE AS PRESSURE  VALVES
In GATT's first decade and a half the renegotiation and emergence action provisions
served, for countries that had reduced and bound their tariffs through the GATT, 9 as the
procedures through which the countries would adjust their trade policy to troublesome imports.
This was as the GATT's initial framers have intended. In time, however, these mechanisms were
replaced by others.
Negotiated export restraints
By the 1960s formal use of Article XIX and of the renegotiations process began to wane.
Actions taken under the escape clause tended to involve negligible  amounts of world trade in
relatively minor product categories.  1( Big problems such as textile and apparel imports were
handled another way, through the negotiation of "voluntary" export restraint agreements, VERs.
The Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement, negotiated in 1962, brought GATT sanction to
industrial countries' VERs on cotton textiles and apparel.  The Multifibre Arrangement, first
negotiated in 1972 and only now being phased out, extended the GATT sanction for such
restrictions to virtually all textile and clothing products.  The same method, negotiated export
9 This  did not include  most  of  the  developing  countries  who  were  members  of  the  GATT.
10  980  statistics  show  that actions  taken under Article  XIX covered  imports  valued at $1.6 billion while  total
world  trade was at the same  time  valued at $2000  billion. Sampson  (1987),  p. 145.
5restraints, or VERs, were used by the industrial countries to control troublesome imports into
several other important sectors, e.g., steel (Table 2).
By the 1970's negotiated or "voluntary export restraints" (VERs) had become the common mode
for dealing with troublesome imports.
Except for those specially  sanctioned by the textile arrangements, VERs were clearly
GATT-illegal." However, while VERs violated GATT legalisms they accorded well with its ethic
of reciprocity:
*  They were at least in form, negotiations to allow replacement of restrictions that had been
negotiated down.  Negotiation was also important to prevent a chain reaction of one country
following another to restrict its imports as had occurred in the 1930s.
*  A VER did provide compensation, the compensation being the higher price that the exporter
would receive. Had imports been restricted to the same volume by a tariff, the scarcity value
(rent) of the restriction would have been collected by the importing country
- In many instances the troublesome increase of imports came from countries that had not been
the "principal suppliers" with whom the initial concession had been negotiated.  These new
exporters were displacing not only domestic production in importing countries, but the exports
of the traditionat suppliers as well. A VER with the new, troublesome, supplier could thus be
viewed as defense of the rights of the principal suppliers who had paid for the initial
concession.
The reality of power politics was another factor.  Even though one of GATT's objectives
was to neutralize the influence of economic power on the determination of trade policy, VERs
were frequently used by large countries to control imports from smaller countries.
VERs, though GATT-illegal, were more consistent with GATT's ethic or reciprocity than
unilateral actions would have been.I
As the renegotiation, emergency action mechanism  was replaced over time by the use of
VERs, VERs also gave way to another mechanism  --  antidumping. There were several reasons
behind this evolution:
the growing realization in industrial countries that a VER was a costly form of protection,1 2
"GATT  1994,  p.494.
6*  the long term legal pressure of the GATT rules,
*  the availability  of an attractive, GATT-legal, alternative.
The Uruguay Round agreement on safeguards explicitly bans further use of VERs and,
along with the agreement on textiles and clothing, requires the elimination  of all such measures
now in place.
Antidumping
Antidumping was a minor instrument when GATT was negotiated, and provision for
antidumping regulations was included with little controversy. In 1958, when the contracting
parties finally canvassed themselves about the use of antidumping,  the resulting tally showed only
37 antidumping decrees in force across all GATT member countries, 21 of these in South Africa.
(GATT 1958, p. 14) Since then, antidumping  has become the industrial countries' major
safeguard instrument, and is gaining increasing popularity among developing countries.  The scale
of use of antidumping is a magnitude larger than the scale of use of renegotiations and emergency
actions have ever been.  (Chart 2)  In the 10 years through 1993, for example, only 30 Article
XIX actions were notified to GATT: 3 a year as compared with 164 antidumping cases a year.  13
Antidumping has become the main instrument to deal with troublesome imports.
In the United States, the shift from other measures to antidumping  was propelled by the
US Congress' desire to regain control over trade policy from the Executive.  This branch of
government controlled tariff renegotiations, the implementation of emergency actions and the
negotiation of VERs. By broadening and strengthening the antidumping  law, and eliminating
Presidential discretion to override an affirmative finding,  the Congress could give constituents
access to import relief that would not be diluted by the President's general foreign policy
interests.
The reasons antidumping emerged as a major policy instrument in the European Union
were similar.  Slower growth made European governments sensitive to the displacement of
domestic production by emerging Asian exporters. It was a European Union instrument; by the
12 For  example,  Hufbauer  and  Elliott  found  that of  the  welfare  loss  placed  on  the  US economy  from  all  forms  of
protection  in place  in the  early  1990s,  over  83 percent  of  that loss  came  from  VERs.
13 GATT 1993,  pp. 16,  26. The tally of antidumping  orders  is partial.
7Treaty of Rome, the EU Commission could take antidumping action, the member states could
not.  The Commission, with the instinct of any organization for demonstrating its usefulness and
thereby expanding its turf, pressed forward with antidumping action to preempt member state
governments from serving industries' increased demand for protection.
Antidumping'  s rise to prominence had nothing to do with the logic of a sensible pressure valve
instrument. 
Once antidumping proved itself to be applicable  to any case of troublesome imports, its
other attractions for protection seeking industries and for governments inclined  to provide
protection were apparent.
*  Particular exporters could be picked out.  GATT/WTO does not require multilateral
application.
*  The action is unilateral.  GATT/WTO rules require no compensation or renegotiation.
•  In national practice, the injury test for antidumping action tends to be softer than the
injury test for action under Article XIX.
*  The rhetoric of foreign unfairness provides a vehicle for building a political case for
protection.
. Antidumping and VERs have proved to be effective complements; i.e., the threat of
formal action under the antidumping  law provides leverage to force an exporter to
accept a VER.  14
*  The investigation process itself tends to curb imports.  This is because exporters bear
significant  legal and administrative costs, importers face the uncertainty of having to
pay backdated antidumping duties, once an investigation is completed.
As practice in the initial users of antidumping demonstrated that the instrument could be
applied to virtually any instance of troublesome imports, its use spread to more countries.  The
14 Over 1980-1988, 348 of 774 United States antidumping cases were superseded by VERs (Finger and Murray,
1993). July 1980 through June 1989, of 384 antidumping actions taken by the European Community, 184
were price undertakings.  (Stegmann, 1992).
8data in Table 3 list the countries that have notified antidumping actions to the WTO, 5 the list
including 17 developing countries.
Discipline over antidumping
Though the Uruguay Round agreement on antidumping did not impose major disciplines,
the use of antidumping by the industrial countries has declined notably since the mid 1990s.
Behind this decline have been two factors: (1) an increasing realization in the industrial countries
that their use of antidumping has not served their national interests, (2) general econonic
prosperity - when business is good, petitions for import protection slack off.
Australia was perhaps the first country to realize that its attempt to deregulate industry
and to liberalize trade was being compromised by its own antidumping actions.  Australia had
traditionally supported its manufacturing with quantitative import restrictions and subsidies.
When the Hawke government in the early 1980s began to liberalize  these, protection seeking
interests increasingly  filed for antidumping protection. Australia, for several years, initiated more
antidumping cases than any other country.  The Hawke government, realizing that antidumping
was about to outflank its reform program, pushed through Parliament a revision of Australia's
antidumping law.  The revision provided oversight that allows the government to determine
antidumping actions on the basis of its general trade policy principles.'6
In the United States, industries that use imported inputs, led by the computer industry and
a well-organized group of metals users, have brought increasing pressure on the government to
take their interests into account in any decision to restrict imports.  Their influence brought the
US Congress in April 1996 to hold hearings on possible modification of the US antidumping law.
The law was not amended, in significant  part because the US Department of Commerce, the
administrator of the US law, testified at these hearings that the concerns of the user industries
could be taken into account by revisions of administrative  procedures. Antidumping initiations in
the United States have declined from more than 60 per year in 1992-1993 to only 20 in 1997.
(Annex Table)
The Uruguay  Round  antidumping  agreement  requires  that all members  notify  all antidumping  actions  to the
WTO.
16 Banks  (1993)  reviews  this experience.
9In the European Union, pressure from domestic industries that pay the cost of
antidumping protection have combined with the foreign policy interests of the EU to bring a
similar reduction of antidumping cases 7.  The European Commission  is at present considering
modification of its antidumping procedures to take into account a wide range of parties on all
sides of the issue. 
18
|  Realization that their antidumping actions were inconsistent with the overall shape of their|
|trade policies has led some industrial countries to notably reduce their use of antidumping.l
The developing countries have apparently not yet realized the need for internal discipline
over the use of antidumping. While use of antidumping  has been declining among the industrial
countries, it is rising among developing countries. As of July 1996, a total of 58 developing and
transition economy countries have notified antidumping laws or regulations to the WTO.  Indeed,
in the latest period for which the WTO tabulation is available (July 1996 - June 1997) developing
countries initiated more antidumping  investigations than did industrial countries.  (Chart 3)
|Developing countries have not yet realized the dangers in the use of antidumping.l
LESSONS  FROM  GATT/WTO  EXPERIENCE
In understanding such GATT provisions, it is useful to remember that in the immediate
post WW-II period the International Trade Organization (ITO) negotiations were the centerpiece
of international commercial diplomacy. This was the forum at which the international community
negotiated over rules and institutions for the trading system. The GATT emanated from a more
modest negotiation intended only to reach agreement to reduce tariffs. The rules for
implementing  these reductions, participants presumed, would be agreed at the ITO negotiations.
The ITO negotiations never came to agreement, but basically  the same countries did reach
agreement to reduce tariffs. Needing a legal instrument (contract) that put these reductions into
effect the tariff negotiators put together the GATT. With the pressure on to implement the
agreed reductions before protectionist interests could block them, the reformers attempted to buy
17 In the late 1  980s and early 1  990s,  almost  half of EU antidumping  cases  were against  Eastern European
countries.
8 International  Trade  Reporter,  p. 257.
10off the protectionists by including in the GATT a number of provisions that would allow countries
to impose new trade restrictions.  They did not have time to think through the long-run
implications of these provisions. Fifty years of experience however make evident the following
lessons.
Lesson 1: GATT provisions are fungible.
Each GATT provision for import restrictions appears to apply only in a specific
circumstance; e.g., a restriction necessary for national security, to safeguard the balance of
payments, to promote an infant industry, to offset dumping. In practice, these provisions have
proven to be quite fungible. The industrial countries' practice shows that action against
troublesome imports can be legally  packaged as an Article VI antidumping  action, or just as
conveniently, as an Article XIX emergency action.  Similarly,  developing countries seeking GATT
legality for restrictions that were, in economics, infant industry protection (Article XVIII.C),
found it administratively  more convenient  - and no legal problem  - to declared them as
restrictions to protect the balance of payments (Article XVIII.B)19
Lesson 2: GATT provisions provide little discipline.
GATT's drafters presumed that discipline  would be provided by reciprocity. That is why
they established renegotiation and emergency actions as the means by which a country would
adjust its tariff rates to troublesome imports. The evolution of the VER evaded the power of
reciprocity as pressure against restrictions.  Antidumping,  today's  favorite instrument, is
completely outside the bounds of reciprocity - unilateral action is explicitly  permitted.
As to the provisions (in Table 1) that specify  when various restrictive actions may be
taken, practice has shown that such action is almost always possible under the rules.  In short,
GATT allows import relief in every instance in which imports cause or threaten injury, i.e., are
troublesome to domestic competitors.  Import relief therefore is available in every instance in
which domestic competitors would complain. The Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement
makes no attempt to correct the weakness of the economic principles on which GATT/WTO
19 The point is documented  in Finger  and Winters  (1998)
11treatment of antidumping is based.  Its attempts to discipline  the imposition of new restrictions
depend entirely on procedural, not substantive constraints.
Lesson 3: GATT provisions do not provide a basis for sorting between restrictions that
would serve the national economic interest and those that would not.
This conclusion follows quickly from the previous two. When import competing
producers would benefit from protection (injury would be avoided), the rules allow protection.
The rules do not require that a government, in deciding on a petition for protection, take into
consideration the costs that would accrue to domestic users of imports.  The Box (attached)
elaborates this point.
These conclusions do not mean that the GATT rules cannot be useful to a government
that wants to maintain a liberal trade policy. The rules do not require protection in every instance
in which they allow it. As Section II will explain, the procedural and transparency guidelines the
GATT/WTO provide can be the basis of an economically  and politically sensible mechanism for
determining when requests for exceptional protection will be honored, and when not.
2.  AN ECONOMICALLY  SENSIBLE  SAFEGUARD
MECHANISM
Implementing a sensible safeguards policy is not rocket science. In the abstract, good
economic policy consists of government interventions that make economic sense -- that provide
greater benefits than costs to members of the society for which the government is responsible. In
practice, maintaining an economically  sensible international trade policy is often a matter of
avoiding interventions that have greater costs than benefits  - or when the realities of domestic
politics are taken into account - a matter of minimizing  the number or the effect of such
interventions.
There will be cases in which other domestic considerations make it impossible to avoid an
economically  unsound trade intervention. In those instances, good policy becomes a matter of:
making restrictions transparent;
12*  avoiding their becoming precedent for further restrictions; and,
*  managing them so as to strengthen the politics of avoiding rather than of imposing such
restrictions.
ANTIDUMPING  IS A BAD INSTRUMENT
Antidumping is not a good instrument for fine tuning -- for determining changes in the
degree of protection provided different industries. The reasons follow.
Antidumping's criteria make no economic sense. They do not provide a government a
basis for sorting out those interventions that would provide greater benefits than costs to the
20 domestic economy.
Antidumping arms protection-seeking interests with the emotionally compelling argument
that foreigners are behaving unfairly. It provides however the government no basis for answering
that argument.  A review by the OECD of antidumping  cases in Australia, Canada, the European
Union and the United States found that 90 percent of the instances of import sales found to be
unfair under antidumping rules would have been considered fair (under competition law) if
practiced in domestic commerce, i.e., if used by a domestic enterprise in making a domestic sale.
The Uruguay Round agreement on antidumping  includes onerous requirements on
procedure and documentation.  During the Uruguay Round negotiations, a group of countries
tried to eliminate a number of ambiguities and loopholes that allow its widespread application.
They had no success in eliminating  these provisions; their only success was in adding detailed
procedural and notification requirements. These requirements bear on a government in two ways.
First, they make the investigation process expensive. Second, they provide neither political nor
economic basis to answer a protection-seeking interest's exploitation of the rhetoric of unfairness.
The Korean government, for example, was found by a GATT panel to have improperly imposed
an antidumping duty because of the form in which the records of the investigating commission
were kept.  That left the Korean government squeezed between, the legal obligation under the
20 The competitive practices that antidumping advocates accuse foreign enterprises of following are sometimes
those that would harm the national economic interest of the importing country.  An antidumping
investigation does not serve to establish that these practices, in fact, have been used. The rhetoric of
antidumping is one thing, what one has to prove in order to gain import relief is another.
21 OECD Economics Department  1996, p.  18
13GATT to lift the antidumping duty, and on the other side, the argument that the protection-
seeking industry had presented.  The procedural infraction cited by the GATT panel gave the
22 Korean government neither economic nor political argument with which to answer the industry.
In domestic politics, a GATT decision based on such grounds would tend to discredit the idea of
following international rules.  It would not buttress the politics of integration into international
markets.
Antidumping provides a no lose situation for a protection-seeking industry, a no win situation for
the government.
Finally, antidumping focuses on the wrong issue.  The nature of the foreign business
practice is not the key issue.  The key issue is the impact on the local economy.
A BETTER SAFEGUARD MECHANISM
The key issue is the impact on the local economy. Who in the local economy would
benefit from the proposed import restriction, and who would lose?  On each side, by how much?
It is therefore critical that the policy process by which the government decides to intervene or not
to intervene gives voice to those interests that benefit from open trade and would bear the costs of
the proposed intervention. In this spirit, I outline below a policy mechanism  that would:
*  first, help the government to separate trade interventions that would serve the national
economic interest from those that would not, and
*  second, even in those instances in which the decision is to restrict imports, support the politics
of openness and liberalization.
Guidelines for procedures
A familiar  investigation of injury from imports to competing domestic producers would be
part of an economically sensible safeguard procedure.  However, as explained in the Box, an
injury investigation captures only half of the impact on the domestic economy. It identifies those
domestic interests that would benefit from the proposed restriction, but it leaves out of account
those interests who would be penalized by restricted access to imports. These costs, and the
22  The example  is not a isolated  one. Finger and Fung  (1993) document  that every  antidumping  action that had
been brought  to a GATT  panel had been  found  to be in violation  on procedural  grounds.
14people in the domestic economy who will bear them, should have the same standing in law and in
administrative practice as the other side already enjoys. Economic analysis  of the impact of the
restriction on users would proceed in parallel with the analysis of "injury" to competing domestic
producers. More expensive imports will cost somebody money and eliminate somebody's job if
imports are needed materials The concepts and techniques would be much the same. Injury (to
users of imports) that would result from reduced access to imports would be measured in the
same dimensions as injury (to those who compete with imports) from import competition: lost
sales, lost profits, lost jobs, etc.
A process of the sort suggested makes political as well as economic sense. By giving
voice to interests that would bear the costs of the proposed import restriction, the process will
help to fortify the politics of not granting the restriction.
The following are general guidelines.
Identify the costs and the losers. Procedures should bring out the costs of the requested
exception, and the identities of the persons or groups who will bear these costs.  More expensive
imports will cost somebody money and - if the imports are needed materials - eliminate
somebody's job.  These costs, and the people in the domestic economy who will bear them,
should have the same standing in law and in administrative  practice as the other side already
enjoys. The process of considering the request for an exception should be used to help fortify the
politics of not granting it.
Be clear that the action is an exception.  Public statements should establish that the
requested action would be an exception to the principles that underlay the liberalization program
and should emphasize that an accumulation of such exceptions would constitute abandonment of
the liberalization program and loss of its benefits. Including in the investigation process an
expression of the costs that the proposed restriction would impose will help to make the point that
the action is an exception to the generally beneficial policy of openness to international
competition.
Don 't sanctify the criteria for  the action.  Procedures should not presume, as antidumping
does, that there is some good reason for granting exceptions.  Procedures that compare the
situation of the petitioner with pre-established criteria for granting import relief should be
15avoided. Procedures should stress that the function of the review is to identify the benefits, costs,
and the domestic winners and losers for the requested action.
The third guideline is more important than it might seem. The history of antidumping and
other trade remedies shows that clever people will always be able to present their situation exactly
as the criteria describe. If you start out to find just the few exporters who are being unfair to
Mexico or to the United States or to Ecuador, you will soon be swamped by evidence that
everyone is.
At the technical level, useful concepts for investigation procedures - such as
transparency and automatic expiration for any exception that is granted (a sunset clause) - can
be gleaned from procedural requirements included in the Uruguay Round Safeguards Agreement.
16BOX: THE FLAWED ECONOMICS OF BASING DECISIONS
ON AN INJURY INVESTIGATION
Economists demonstrated more than two centuries ago that import restrictions often
subtract more from the national economic interest of the country that imposes them than they add
to it.  There is nothing in such economics to suggest that import competition will be beneficial to
all domestic interests, i.e., not be troublesome to some domestic interests.  On the contrary, there
are net gains from trade because the benefits to some domestic interests exceed the cost of import
competition to others
HI  a-lf o f D  lo  m es tic In te rests  HaveAn  injury  investigation  acknowledges
Ni>  Chance  To. Scoreonly  half of the familiar economics of
. international trade. It gives standing to the costs
.22  .of  trade, but it leaves out the gains.  It
enfranchises the domestic interests that bear the
burden  of import competition and would
g  therefore benefit from an import restriction.
However, it disenfranchises  the domestic
interests that would bear the costs of the import restriction - or, on the reverse side, the gains
from not imposing it.
As analogy, one might imagine the domestic interests that would benefit from the
restriction playing right to left on the soccer pitch depicted above, while those that would bear the
costs play left to right.  The investigatory process allows goals only by import-competing
interests.  In the score that determines the outcome, the interests of users of imports and others
that would bear the costs of the import restriction simply  are not counted.
A safeguard petition is a request for an action by a government.  Correctly deciding when
to take or not to take action begins by asking the right question.  The right question is, Who in the
domestic economy will benefit  from the proposed action and who will lose-and  by how much?
17Safeguard investigations should not
focus solely on the effect of the proposed
restriction on domestic producers of like  or 
competing  goods,  but rather should focus on  ￿
the national economic interest of the 
restrictinig  country. National economic
interest, in this context, is the sum of
benefits to all nationals who benefit minus
the costs to all nationals who lose.  Injury, as
it is defined in safeguards and antidumping laws, takes into account only one of the two sides that
make up the national economic interest.  An economically  sensible  process would allow both sides
-those  that will benefit from a trade restriction and those that will bear the costs  -to  score.
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Table 1: Frequency  of Use of GATT Provisions that Allow Trade Restrictions
Instrument  I  Frequency of use
1. Provisions for renegotiating previous concessions and commitments
Periodic - three year - renegotiations (at the initiative of the  January 1955 - March 1994: 206 renegotiation procedures, 128 of
country wanting to increase a bound rate), §XXVII.  1 and  these under §XXVIII.5.'
§XXVIII.5;
Special circumstance renegotiations (requires GATT  Sixty-four renegotiations since 1948."
authorization), §XXVI1.4;
Increase of a duty with regard to formation of a customs union,  Follows procedures of §XXVIII, hence included in figures above.
§XXIV.6;
Withdrawal of a concession in order to provide iifant industry  Nine withdrawals, through March 1994.'
protection, §XVII.A.
2. Restrictions that can be imposed unilaterally
General Exceptions, §XX  Notification  not required.  Between 1974-1987 six developing
countries notified quantitative  restrictions under §XX, covering 131
products.iv
Restrictions to apply standards, to classify, §XI.2.b  Notification not required.  Between 1974-1987 six developing
countries notified quantitative restrictions under §XX, covering 131
products.v
Restrictions on agricultural or fisheries products. §XI.2.c  Notification not required.  No information available.
National security exception, §XXI  One developing country, Thailand, notified under §XXI between
1974-1987. Further information not available.v"
Withdrawal of a concession initially negotiated with a  As of 1994, §XXVII has been used by 15 countries with regard to: (a)
government that fails to join GATT, or withdraws, §XXV1I.  withdrawals by China, Syria, Lebanon and Liberia; (b) Colombia,
who participated  in the Annecy Round (1949) but did not accede then:
and (c) Korea and the Philippines, who participated in the Torquay
Round (1951) but did not accede then."'
Non-application at the time of accession, §XXXV.  As of 1994, this article had been invoked (a) against Japan by 53
countries - invocations since withdrawn by 50: (b) by 16 other
countries against 21 countries.  Onily 10 §XXXV invocations are
presently operative.  "
Restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments. general  Three countries had such restrictions in place at least one time during
§VII.  the period, 1974-1986."
Restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments, developing  Twenty-four countries had such restrictions in place a least one time
countries: §XVIII:B.  during the period 1974-1986.'
Emergency actions, §XIX.  1950 through 1984: 124 actions (3.6 a year)
1985 through 1994:  26 actions (3.25 a year)"
Countervailing duties, §VI.  July  1985 -June 1992: 187 investigations (27 a year), of which 106
by the United States, 38 by Australia"'
Antidumping  duties, §VI.  July 1985 -June  1992: 1148 investigations (164 a year), of which 300
by USA, 282 by Australia, 242 by EU, 124 by Canada, 84 by
Mexico.'
3. Restrictions that require specific GATT approval
Waivers, §XXV;  Through March 1994, 113 waivers granted, 44 still in force.v
Retaliation authorized under dispute settlement. §XXII;  Once.-
Exceptions specified in accession agreement, §XXXIII;  Not tabulated."'
Releases from bindings to pursue infant industry protection,  Nine countries in 47 years.""
§XVII.C;
Releases from bindings by a 'more-developed' country to  Never."'
pursue infant industry protection, §XVIII.D.
20Table 1: Notes
GATT 1994, pp. 892-910.
GATT 1994,  pp. 892-910.
GATT 1994, p. 465.  These were made by Benelux on behalf  of:  Suriname  (1958), Greece (1956,65), Indonesia  (1983), Korea (1958) and Sri
Lanka (1955121,56,57).
iv  OECD, 1992, p. 100.  Information  relating to Articles  XX, XI and XXI is generally  not available, since notification  is not required. The OECD
source cited provides information  on developing  country  notification  of  these articles  for the period noted.
v  OECD, 1992, p. 100.  Information  relating to Articles  XX, XI and XXI is generally  not available,  since notification  is not required.  The OECD
source cited provides information  on developing  country  notification  ofthese articles  for the period noted.
OECD, 1992, p. 100.
GATT 1994, pp. 861-62.
v  GATT 1994, pp. 958-960.
ix Anjaria 1987,  p. 675.
x Anjaria 1987,  p. 675.
X  GATT 1994, pp. 500-516.
Xii GATT, Basic Instruments  and Selected  Documents,  Annex Table "Summary  of Antidumping  Actions,  [date]," 1985-86  through  1991-92  volumes.
x  GATT 1993, Appendix  Table 1.
GATT  1994,  pp. 828-839.
xv GATT  1994,  p. 630.
xvG  GATT 1994, p. 948 lists five countries  whose protocols  of accession  included  provisions  allowing specific  measures  which were otherwise GATT-
illegal  to remain in place for a limited  time.
xvi  Anj  aria 1987, p. 670.  These countries  are Cote d'Ivoire,  Indonesia,  Malaysia, Thailand,  Zimbabwe,  Cuba, Haiti, India and Sri Lanka.
GATT 1994, p. 465.
21Table 2: Arrangements in Force as of September 1989
A. By period of Introduction  B. By  Product
Prior  to 1975  36  Food and other agricultural products  59
Textiles  and clothing*  44
1975-1979  39  Steel  and steel products  44
Electronic  products  22
1980-84  69  Motor  vehicles  and equipment  20
Footwear  1  2
1985-89  105  Machine  tools  12
Other  36
Total  249  Total  249
* Excluding bilateral quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing imposed under the Multifibre Agreement.
Note: The restraint arrangements included in the table include voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements, export forecasts and
discriminatory  import systems, plus non-governmental and/or arrangements on an individual industry or industry association level, as well as unilateral
restraint  decisions.
Source: GATT (1991).  The Intemational Trade Environment: Report by the Director General, 1989-1990.  Geneva: GATT.
22Table 3: Recent Antidumping initiations and number of antidumping measures in force
Number of Initiations, I July 1996 - 30 June 1997  - Measures in
Country  against  Forceaon
or Group
China  D'ed C's  D'ing  C's  Trans.  Ec. C's  --------------
I July 1997
_ _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _  - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.-.---....-,----  .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  . ...  .
Argentina  8  6  4  1  2
Australia  5  8  8  1  56
Brazil  5  5  6  3  4  23
Canada  2  2_  =  2  2  95
Chile  0  0  0  1  2  2
Colombia  0  0  t__  7
European  3  13  _5  _157
Community
India  2  12  5  1  19
Indonesia  2  0  5  2  na
Israel  0  6  1  0  na
Japan  0  0  0  0  °  3
Korea  4  9  2  3  21
Malaysia  0  1  1  0  4
Mexico  0  3  2  0  100
New Zealand  0  0  1  o0  |t  26
Peru  2  0  1  i  0  6  6
Philippines  0  2  1  1  __  O  _  0  na
Singapore  0  0  0  0  2
South Africa  0  5  3  3  40
Thailand  0  0  0  1  na
Turkey  2  3  0  0  37
United States  6  7  5  2  305
Venezuela  0  0  0  0  __°3
Source:  WTO,  Committee  on Antidumping  Practices,  "Semiannual  Report  Under  Article 16.4  of the Agreement,"  for individual  countries.
Notes:
alncludes  definitive  duties and price  undertakings.
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25ANNEX TABLE
Numbers of Antidumping Initiations
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Industrial
Australia  54  40  20  19  23  46  76  61  45  6  22
Austria  0  0  0  0  0  0  4  4  0  0
Canada  27  24  20  14  15  12  16  37  22  9  6  8
E.U.  23  17  30  29  15  15  23  33  47  37  16  26
Finland  0  5  5  0  0  1  0  0  0  0
Japan  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  0  1  0  0  0
New Zealand  0  0  4  8  1  13  4  2  9  9  1
Sweden  2  0  0  2  4  2  1  0  0  0
U.S.  63  41  31  25  24  52  62  68  47  30  16  20
Total Industrial  169  127  r  110  1  97  82  |  134  [  198  207  164  ]  91  |  55  |  77
Developing
Argentina  6  42  18
Brazil  0  0  1  2  0  2  9  4  30  12  1  19
Chile  2  4  2
Colombia  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  4  1  5  1
Guatemala  I
India  0  0  0  0  0  0  5  3  1  9  5  20
Israel  4  7
Korea  3  I  0  0  3  2  0  7  4  3  6  18
Malaysia  2
Mexico  0  0  2  12  1  1  13  25  24  23  18  3  5
Peru  4  4  3
Philippines  2
Poland  0  0  0  0  0  24  0  0  0  0
Singapore  2  0
South Africa  9  14  II
Thailand
Turkey  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  21  2  0  5
Venezuela  1  5  0
Total Developing  |I  3  14  914  41  |  38  |  83  |  69  94  114Policy  Research Working Paper Series
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